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Notice and Claim under the Illinois Workmen's
Compensation Act
JAMES F. OATES, JR., of the Chicago Bar.
This note has to do first with the requirements of the Illinois Workmen's
Compensation Act as to the giving of notice and the filing of claim within
the periods prescribed by the terms of the Act.
The cases of
Haiselden v. Industrial Board, 275 Ill. 114;
Bushnell v. Industrial Board, 276 Ill. 262,
establish the rule that the giving of notice and the filing of claim according
to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act are jurisdictional and no
decision on an award under the Act can be sustained in the absence of evidence showing that these requirements have been met by the petitioner. The
section which contains the matter under discussion is Section 24 and reads in
part as follows:
. "Provided no proceedings for compensation under this Act shall be
maintained unless claim for compensation has been made within six
months after the accident, or in the event that payments have been
made under the provisions of this Act unless either claim for compensation has been made within six months after such payments have
ceased and a receipt therefor or a statement of the amount of compensation paid shall have been filed with the Comr' ,.ion. Provided, that
no employee who after the accident returns to the employment of the
employer in whose services he was injured shall be barred for failureto make such claim if an application for adjustment of such claim is
filed with the Industrial Commission within eighteen months after he
returns to such employment * * *"

The words: "payments have been made under the provisions of this Act"
have been subjected to judicial interpretation on several occasions. The last
and now controlling authority on the subject is the case of Marshall Field &
Co. v. Industrial Board, 305 Ill. 134. This case involved injuries sustained by
a female employee of Marshall Field & Co., who developed hysteria resulting
from a fall undergone during the course of her employment. The accident
occurred February 18, 1919. From the 18th of February, the injured person
worked until March 3rd when she was absent for a year, returning to' her
former employment on March 15, 1920, where she remained until November
17, 1920. Marshall Field & Co. paid the petitioner half pay from March 3,
1919 to July 1, 1919, in accordance with a benefit plan. On June 30, 1919 the
petitioner, when absent from her employment, wrote the division superintendent of the respondent propounding the following query:
"If I am entitled to any. more money will you please have it
sent me?"
Payments were made to her on July 2nd in an aggregate amount of $110.00.
On September 20, 1919 the petitioner wrote her immediate superior asking
her to see a certain official in regard to "any money coming," adding that
she could well make use of it. The respondent answered this last letter
saying that under the circumstances all had been done that was reasonable.
The employer raised several questions for the consideration of the Supreme
Court, and argued that neither notice was given nor claim made under the
terms of the Act within the time required. The court disposed of the notiq.__'-
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question by holding that the facts and circumstances of the accident were
known to the petitioner's division st'perintendents and that the Company had
reasonable knowledge of the accident within the time prescribed, 30 days.
This was so, even though the employee had not given what is known as a
technical notice.
In reference to the question whether or not claim had been made under
the terms of the statute, the court reviewed the facts mentioned above pertaining to the payment of benefits and held that the plaintiff's letters to the
Company of June 30, 1919 and September 20, 1919, having been mailed and
received within the six months after the date of the last payment, constituted
claims for compensi-tion within the meaning of the Act. The court's opinion
was based on the fact that the demands contained in the letters were quite
clearly for money believed by the writer to be owed to her from her former
employer. This holding raised the question as to whether or not the payments made by Marshiall Field & Co. from March 3rd to July 1st were within
the meaning of the language quoted above from the Act so that demands
made within six months after the date of the last of such payments, would.
meet the requirements of the Act. This necessitated a discussion of the
nature of these payments and the court said in this regard:
"Though the plaintiff in error, in making the payments, was
simply following out a policy which it had adopted with reference to
its employees without regard to any liability to them for compensation, yet, where compensation was actually due, the employee had a right
to regard such payments as made under the Compensation Act and
was not bound to make demand for any further compensation so long
as they continued."
The court then distinguished the case at bar from Ohio Oil Co. vs. Indus461, where the employer, to the knowledge of the
trial Commission, 293 I11.
employee's attorney, expressly denied liability under the Act. The Supreme
Court then went on to say that as notice had been given within 30 days after
the accident and as claim had properly been made by the injured employee
within six months after the date of the last of the payments mentioned above,
her claim with the Industrial Commission was properly filed within eighteen
months after the date, March 15, 1920, upon which she returned to Marshall
Field & Co. to work.
In the Ohio Oil Co. case supra the action was brought by an administratrix to
recover compensation for the death of her intestate husband. The deceased,
on August 29, 1916, while working at his employment with the Oil Company,
received a blow from a flying stick, which necessitated an operation in the
latter part of March 1917. The deceased had worked during the intervening
period. It was found on March 22, 1917, at the time of the operation, that
the deceased was suffering from cancer, and, while liereturned on August 13,
1917 to work, he was forced to stop October 22, 1917 and on April 2, 1918 he
died from the effect of the concer. The Oil Company, from December 18,
1917 until March 27, 1918, paid the deceased at the rate of $10 per week and
the Company also paid his hospital bills until October 1, 1917. The matters
in dispute, among others, were that no notice had been given within 30 days
and that no claim for compensation had been made within six months. The
o;lv evidence of the notice was the testimony of the administratrix, whom
the court held was clearly incompetent to testify by virtue of the common

THE CHICAGO KENT REVIEW

7

law and sections I and 5 of the Evidence Act, and the petitioner's case was,
therefore, defeated because of the lack of notice. But the court went on to
discuss the question as to whether claim had been properly made under
section 24 of the Act.
After saying:
"The notice within thirty days and claim for compensation within
six months are jurisdictional, and an award cannot be sustained in the
absence of evidence of the compliance with. these requirements of the
statute"
the court considered the facts having to do with the dispute concerning the
claim. As the administratrix had served a written claim for compensation.
on the Oil Company on June 25, 1918, which was within six months after
the last of the weekly payments, the last payment having been made March
27, 1918, the question resolved itself into the same matter which concerned
the court in the Marshall Field case, viz: Were these payments such as to be
"payments-unaer the provision of -this Act"? The Supreme Court in the
Ohio Oil case then laid stress on the fac that the employer had denied liability to make the payments, the nature of which was in dispute, and this
denial was known to the deceased and the defendant in error. It will be
remembered that the Marshall Field case distinguished the facts in that casee
with the facts of the Ohio Oil Co. case on this very ground.
It is well to note' the nature of the denial of liability by the Ohio Oil Co.
upon which the Supreme Court placed so much importance. This opinion
shows that after the operation, March 22, 1917, an attorney representing the
injured man called at the offices of the Oil Company and requested compensation for- his client. He was notified a few days later that the Company
refused to make payments and that proceedings would have to be instituted
before the Industrial Board. Later, however, the Oil Company, "apparently
moved by the destitute condition of the injured man's family, said that they
would "do something for him." No definite agreement was made as to just
what they would do, that is nothing was said by the representative of 'the
employer as to what amount would be paid or as to how long the payments
would be made. These facts, in the opinion of the court, constituted a denial
of liability, which would preclude the possibility of the employee considering
either that the payments were being made under the provisions of the Act or
that a claim made within six months after the payments ceased would be
within the time stipulated by the Act.
The Supreme Court in the Ohio Oil Co. case was forced to distinguish
a still earlier opinion, that of Tribune Co. v. Industrial Commission, 290 Ill. 402.
In the Tribune Co. case, a contract of settlement was entered into between the employer and the employee, presented to the Commission and by'
it approved. The Court in the Tribune Co. case said that as the settlement
agreement had been presented by the employer for the approval of the
Industrial Commission the employer had submitted to the jurisdiction of the
Commission and-waived any question of time limitation then existing. This
was so even though the settlement contract expressly provided that it should
not constitute a submission to the jurisdiction of the Commission or a waiver
of any rights of defense the employer had under the Act. The court in the
Ohio Oil case laid stress on the fact that in the 'case before it no agreement
whatever was made and that, therefore, the payments received by the em-
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pl',yee, coming as they did after denial of liability, could only be considered as

incre gratuities and that, therefore, as the claim was not made within six
nionths after the injury, it was not made in time, even though the claim was
made within six months after the date of the last gratuitous payment.
The court then discussed the question as to whether or not claim was
filed before the Commission within the time stipulated by the Act. The Act
provided that in the event an employee returns to the employment of the
employer in whose service he was injured he shall be allowed to file a notice
of his claim within eighteen months after the return. In the Ohio Oil Co.
case the administratrix had filed a claim for compensation within eighteen
months after August 13, 1917, which was the date Brown returned to work
after leaving the hospital. The court held that this was not a compliance
with the statute. In speaking of the statute the Court said:
"Its intention is to extend, for eighteen months after his return to work,
the right of an employee to maintain an existing claim and not to grant
a right."
The clear meaning of this language is that if an employee, who has been
injured, has not made a claim upon the employer within the proper six months'
period, he cannot, by filing a claim before the Industrial Commission within
eighteen months after his return to work, obtain a right to prosecute his
claim to compensation, which he has already lost.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois in the Ohio Oil Co. case,
as noted above, made mention of the opinion written in Tribune Co. v. The
Industrial Commission, 290 111. 402. A consideration of this question renders
necessary a discussion of this case. The case raises an additional question
which is important in its possible implications concerning the waiver of jurisdictional defects by submission to arbitration. The discussion of the Ohio
Oil Co. case (Supra) makes mention of the fact that in the Tribune Co. case
a contract of settlement was agreed upon and presented to and approved by
the Industrial Commission. This contract provided for a lump sum settlement and by its terms stipulated that it should not constitute an admission on
the part of the employer that the Industrial Board could properly acquire jurisdiction or as a waiver of the employer's right to insist upon such jurisdictional defects as did exist.
The defects had to do with the failure to meet the requirements of section
24. The facts are as follows:
An employee of the Tribune Co. was injured August 23, 1915 and wds
paid compensation by the Tribune Co. at the rate of $6 a week, being onehalf of his weekly wage, for a period of nine weeks, the last payment being
made in October of 1915. In March of 1917 the Tribune Co. and the injured
employee, whose condition had not been entirely healed, entered into the
contract of settlement. At this time the Industrial Commission entered an
award under the Workmen's Compensation Act based on the settlement
agreement. On July 23, 1918 the employee filed a petition for review under
that section of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 19H, which provides for
review by the Commission in cases where the disability of the employee "has
subsequently recurred, increased, diminished or ended." After due notice to
the Tribune Co., the decision of the Commission was made on March 5, 1917
and provided for an award in behalf of the injured man. The Circuit Court
of Cook County confirmed the decision of the Industrial Commission and the
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case was brought to the Supreme Court. The Tribune Co., among other
matters, raised the point that as the statutory period, six months, during
which, by the terms of the Act, an employee must make his claim, had expired at the time the settlement contract was executed and approved, the
Industrial Commission was without jurisdiction and the petition under 19H
to review the provisions of the settlement contract should not have been
considered by the Commission. Seventeen months had elapsed since the last
payment made by the Tribune Co., October 1915, when the settlement contract, March 1917, was executed and approved. The employee's counsel argued
that the settlement contract conferred jurisdiction on the Industrial Commission by consent. The Tribune Co.'s position was that under the authority
of Haiselden v. Industrial Board, 275 Ill. 114, Bushnell v. Industrial Commission, 276 111. 262, and Barrett Co. v. Industrial Commission, 288 Ill. 39, the
jurisdictional requirements of section 24 were basic, and that therefore, the
acts of the parties could not confer jurisdiction on the Industrial Commission.
The Tribune Co. also urged that the settlement contract itself stipulated that
no jurisdiction was being conferred, nor was any right to object being waived.
The court then considered the effect of entering into a settlement agreement
and referring the same for the approval of the Industrial Commission. The
court cited Wabash Ry. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 286 Ill. 194 where it was
held that any settlement or agreement must be considered to have been made
under the provisions of the Act, and applied the reasoning and holding of
the Wabash Ry. case to the case at bar, saying:
"Section 24 of the Workmen's Compensation Act contains a provision to the effect that technical notice is not necessary provided the
employer has actual notice, and the general rule seems to be that while
the defendant may make a quasi appearance for the purpose of objecting to the manner in which he is brought before the court, and, in fact,
to show that he is not legally there at all, 'if he ever appears to the
merits he submits himself completely to the jurisdiction of the court
and must abide the consequences.' Krull vs. Keener, 18 111. 65; Supreme
Hive Ladies Maccabees vs. Harrington, 227 Il1. 511."
and again
"By the settlement agreement both parties submitted to the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission on the merits of the case, and the
conclusion necessarily follows that they waived jurisdiction as to the
time limitation with reference to voluntary payment, even though the
agreement stated to the contrary. * * * We do not agree with the
argument of counsel that the question of the time when the application
was filed is one of jurisdiction of the subject matter rather than jurisdiction of the person."
It seems that on the facts presented for decision the attitude of the Supreme
Court in the Tribune Co. case was correct. But where the court quoted from
the cases, the language seems unfortunate. The subsequent cases, the
Ohio Oil case and the Marshall Field case, clearly show a consistent
ruling by the court that a denial of liability, even when payments are made,
will protect the employer and under no circumstances will give to- the employee a right to relieve himself from the obligation of meeting the requirements of the Act in making claim within the proper period. But this is one
thing, and, as the court in the Ohio Oil Co. case has directly said, the submission of a case for the approval of the Commission amounts to a decidedly
different matter. But the language of the court is more general; indeed, the
court says that they do not agree that the question of the time when the
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application was filed is one of the jurisdiction of the subject matter rather
than jurisdiction of the person, and the court says that an appearance to the
merits is a complete submission to the jurisdiction of the court. At this point
it should be mentioned that the cases cited by the court in support of this last
statement, KruU v. Keener, 18 Ill. 65; Suprene Hive Ladies Maccabees v.
Harrington, 227 II. 511; are not Industrial Board cases but simply apply -the
familiar rule that a general appearance in a law suit waives the right to protest against improper service of summons and kindred jurisdictional matters.
The decision in the Tribune Co. case, therefore, raises the following question: Does participation by the respondent in a voluntary hearing before the
arbitrator waive the respondent's right to later insist before the Industrial
Commission or before the Circuit Court that the petitioner has not met basic
jurisdictional requirements because of a failure to give notice to or serve a
claim upon the employer within the period stipulated by the Workmen's
Compensation Act? It is believed that the law is well settled that such a
waiver does not take place.
In this regard the case of Bushnell v. Industrial Board, 276 Ill.'262 stands
as authority. The petitioner in the Bushnell case, while engaged in his work
on November 4, 1913 twisted, his leg and'sustained the injury in question.
No formal notice was served upon his employer within the 30 days prescribed and this defect was sought to be remedied by testimony concerning
a conversation held between the injured man and his foreman on the following
day. During this conversation the petitioner told the foreman he had hurt his
leg while tearing up the floor and a few days later he told the foreman that
he had a "game leg." In reference to the question as to whether or not this
would constitute a proper notice within the meaning of the compensation act,
the court said:
"While the statute is very liberal in its provisions as to the character
of the notice to be given and provides that no defect or inaccuracy
therein shall bar the proceedings unless the employer proves that he is
unduly prejudiced by such defect or inaccuracy, and that the failure to
give such notice shall not relieve the employer from liability when the
facts and circumstances of such accident are known to the employer or
his agent or vice-principal, still we think it is both the spirit and intention of the act that the employer shall have notice, either by formal
notice or knowledge of such facts and circumstances of the accident as
will apprise him that his employee has sustained injuries of such a
character as to entitle him to compensation under the Act and that he'
may reasonably expect that such claim will be made.
"The mere fact that Stewart told the foreman, in response to the
question as to what caused him to limp, that he had wrenched his leg
in attempting to tear up the floor, without making any claim for compensation for such injury or suffering any interruption of his work, was
not sufficient -notice of the facts and circumstances ofthe accident to
entitle him to compensation under the provisions of section 24 of that
Act without giving of any other notice."
The authority cited by this court in support of this language was the case of
'Parker-Washington Co. v. Industrial Board, 274 111. 496,
The next question presented for the decision of the Supreme Court in the
Bushnell case was whether or not a proper claim had been made within six
months after the accident as required by section 24. No formal demand was
made by the injured man, until May 21, 1914, which was more than six
months after November 4, 1913, the date of the injury. The injured man,
.however, on April 17, 1914 told his employer that he 'had hurt his leg tearing
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up the floor, but the records showed no proof that any formal or informal
claim was made at that time for compensation under the Act. The court in
its discussion of this question clearly indicates that a claim, to be a claim
under the Act, must be-one for compensation under.the Act for the injury in
question. In speaking of the nature of the requirements of the Act, that
notice must be given and claim made, the court said:
"In Haiselden v. Industrial Board, 275 Ill. 114 we held the provisions
of section 24 of this Act were mandatory, and that unless claim was
made within six months from the time of the injury it would be barred
by the foregoing provisions of the Act."
The Supreme Court in tlie Bushnell case then gave its answer to the
query, mentioned above, and said:
"Defendants in error concede that it may be true that the record
fails to 'show any specific demand was made within six months, but
insist that if such is the case demand was waived by the failure to raise
the point on the hearing before the committee of arbitration, the Industrial Board or on the hearing in the Circuit Court. With this contention we do not agree. The making of a claim for compensation is
jurisdictional and a condition precedent to the right to maintain such
action, and the burden of proof was upon the claimant to establish such
fact as a part of his case in chief, and in the absence of such proof the
committee of arbitration and the Industrial Board were without jurisdiction to proceed in the matter.
"For the reasons given, the judgment of the Circuit Court must be
reversed."
In this regard it is interesting to note that the Supreme Court in the
Tribune Co. case did not discuss the holding of the Bushnell case, although
it was called to the attention of the court by counsel. The Bushnell case
was a case concerned with the Act itself and still stands as authority for
the propositions discussed. As stated above, the Bushnell case was cited
with approval by the Supreme Court in the Ohio Oil case, which was a later
pronouncement than the opinion rendered in the Tribune Co. case.
In reference to the proper time to raise the question as to whether or not
claim has been made, the opiniOn in the case of Storrs v. Industrial Commission, 285 Ill. 595, is interesting. In that case the court held that the question
as to whether or not claim had been made must be raised by the respondent
before the Industrial Commission or before the Circuit Court and that it
could not be raised for the first time in the Supreme Court.
American Milling Co. v. Industrial Board, 279 Ill. 560.
Here the court held that the question as to whether claim had been properly made within the'requirements of the Act should be raised before the
arbitrator or at least not later than during the hearing before the Board of
Commissioners, but the case does not hold that a hearing on the merits before the arbitrator waives the right to raise the jurisdictional point. In this
regard, see Chicago Packing Co. v. Industrial Board, 282 Ill. 497 where the
court uses similar language.
Jackson v. Industrial Commission, 302 Ii. 281 is a very late opinion where
the Supreme Court says that the question as to whether or not claim was
properly made within the requirements of the Compensation Act would be
waived by the respondent if the contention was not raised before the Industrial Commission. See Wabash Ry. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 286 Ill. 194
and Ridge Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 298 Ill. 532.
The leading case where the language employed by the Supreme Lourt in
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the Tribune case is repeated: in a way which might conflict with the better
opinion is the case of Pocohontas Mining Co. v. Industrial Board, 301 Ill. 462,
475-477. While the opinion in this case might be considered to support and
reaffirm the unfortunate Tribune case doctrine, it must be remembered that
the point under discussion in the Pocohontas Mining Co. case was considerably different from the question with which we are presently concerned. Our
point is as to when the contention should or can be made that notice or claim
was not properly given or made. The Pocohontas case simply held that the
objection that the stenographic report had not been filed within the required
time should be made before the Industrial Board and not for the first time
during the hearing on review in the Circuit Court. It is not believed that the
time limitation governing the filing of the stenographic report of the hearing
before the arbitrator, is a jurisdictional requirement in any degree comparable
to the giving of notice or the making of claim.
CHICAGO-KENT MASTERS CLUB.
The Chicago-Kent Masters Club, incorporated May 9, 1923, is the only
functioning alumni association which is composed of those who have had the
degree of Master of Law conferred upon them by the Chicago-Kent College
of Law. Its second annual election was held Saturday, February 14, 1925, in
the rooms of the Chicago Bar Association, in the Burnham Building.
The following officers were elected for the ensuing term:
President-George F. Scheck, Burnham Building.
Vice President-Michael V. Ostronski, 2827 E. 88th Street.
Secretary-W. Clarence Thomas, 814 City Hall.
Treasurer-Martin E. Corcoran, First National Bank Building.
Chairman Board of Directors-Byron Tyler, Conway Building.
Vice Chairman-Miss Jessie A. Williamson, Juvenile Court.
Members of Board of Directors:
James N. Putman, 2427 W. Diyision Street.
A. Jefferson Schultze, 1545 W. Division Street.
A. H. Ingraham, Reaper Block.
Miss E. Akin, 902 Sunnyside Avenue.
Mrs. Mary Davenport, Kesner Building.
The Club meets the first Saturday afternoon in each month at the Chicago
Bar Association, Burnham Building.
All persons having a Master's degree, who are interested, are requested to
communicate with the officers.
NEW CLASS IN SPEECH.
The organization of the new class in public speaking, conducted by Professor Marsh, instructor of Speech at Northwestern University, has been
completed, with a present enrollment of eighteen members. The size of the
class is limited to twenty members, the purpose of Professor Marsh being to
give individual attention to each man, in aiding him to overcome his handicaps. The present enrollment includes R. S. Bennett, Sam Barth, Chas.
Bullard, Edward Dunne, John Gould, Morris Haft, R. W. Ibenfeldt, L. C.
Kopacz, J. P. Loughnane, Miss Ostrom, W. H. Murphy, Paul Pretzel, R. T.
Populorum, H. E. Roberts, J. C. Stastny, J. Svoboda, J. R. Tews and Miss
Weinman.

